My guess/hope is that the refinery will be converted primarily to storage assets.
If the old Chevron refinery were closed and Par could increase average throughput to 90k barrels/day (from ~78k currently against 94k nameplate capacity) that would be a huge boost to EBITDA/FCF given the operating leverage of a refinery. I think that's a big potential upside at current prices.
As things stand and based on the breakdown they gave in response to Cooperman's question on the last call, I understand management is claiming $150 million "mid-cycle" EBITDA after accounting for $40 million in corporate G&A. I don't think that includes any EBITDA hit from the periodic turnarounds they have to do at the refineries, which appear to happen every 3-4 years. Management estimated the recent Hawaii turnaround cost $20-25 million in EBITDA. I assume a turnaround at the Wyoming refinery would cost less because that refinery is more seasonal, and thus a turnaround should be less disruptive. So, if you estimate $10 million EBITDA decline for the Wyoming turnaround, you get a $30-35 million EBITDA decline every 3-4 years. So, ballpark amortization would be $10 million per year, reducing "normalized" "mid-cycle" EBITDA to $140 million or so.
On the CapEx side of things, management guided to $10-15 million in 2017, which shouldn't include any major turnarounds or pipeline work like they had in 2016. CapEx for the Hawaii turnaround was around $35 million. A turnaround at the smaller Wyoming refinery should be cheaper, so I ballpark it at $20 million. That's $55 million in additional CapEx every 3-4 years, so ballpark the amortization at $15 million year, producing "normalized" CapEx of $25-30 million/year.
So, "normalized" "mid-cycle" EBITDA - "normalized Cap Ex" = ~$110- $115 million/year. Because they won't pay any material amounts of taxes, that should be pretty close to "normalized" "mid-cycle" FCF to the enterprise, ignoring any contribution to or from Laramie.
For a peak at the potential upside of the current assets if the old Chevron refinery were closed, you then estimate the gross margin on an additional ~12k barrels/day throughput at the Hawaii refinery, a very high percentage of which should become FCF given the operating leverage of a refinery.
These are obviously all ballpark estimates based on management's view of "mid-cycle" crack spreads, but do they sound roughly right?