^It seems like the most natural thing to do is to find a good business at a good price and then to assess if the executive suite is aligned but I can see the rationale because executive compensation is an important variable to look at.
In my limited experience, almost all compensation packages do not take into account meaningful long-term return measures into their 'long-term' incentive plans.
For instance, my understanding of the Colgate-Palmolive example (which is typical) is that the relevant committee may use ROIC or EVA-type measures but, in fact, do not, as they seem to use growth of sales, EPS growth and total shareholder return
over a 3-year evaluation period.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/21665/000120677419001074/cl3440361-def14a.htmAnother nagging issue is the fact that companies keep adapting their packages (including when return on capital measures are involved) "to better reflect industry conditions" when, in fact, adaptations are made to maximize short term remuneration outcomes irrespective of long term outcomes. A company I follow and own (Aimia), in 2018, decided to not use the long-term incentive plan and used instead a newly defined short term plan because of a challenging 2018 year.

It also seems that using total shareholder return may be an adequate proxy versus supposedly better measures such as ROIC but only over a longer time frame (10 years? or more) and this is simply not applied in the modern corporate world. This was the idea behind the one-dollar premise of retained earnings described by Mr. Buffett (long term weighting versus short term voting).
I still think that the most reliable measure to determine the level of shareholder-orientation from managers is the amount of ownership that they build and maintain over time especially when they use their own money (earned or not) to buy shares in the open market.